Under the agricultural policies of Country R, farmers can sell any grain not sold on the open market to a...
GMAT Critical Reasoning : (CR) Questions
Under the agricultural policies of Country R, farmers can sell any grain not sold on the open market to a grain board at guaranteed prices. It seems inevitable that, in order to curb the resultant escalating overproduction, the grain board will in just a few years have to impose quotas on grain production, limiting farmers to a certain flat percentage of the grain acreage they cultivated previously.
Suppose an individual farmer in Country R wishes to minimize the impact on profits of the grain quota whose eventual imposition is being predicted. If the farmer could do any of the following and wants to select the most effective course of action, which should the farmer do now?
Passage Analysis:
| Text from Passage | Analysis |
| Under the agricultural policies of Country R, farmers can sell any grain not sold on the open market to a grain board at guaranteed prices. |
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| It seems inevitable that, in order to curb the resultant escalating overproduction, the grain board will in just a few years have to impose quotas on grain production, limiting farmers to a certain flat percentage of the grain acreage they cultivated previously. |
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Argument Flow:
The argument moves from describing the current policy (guaranteed prices for unsold grain) to explaining its unintended consequence (overproduction) to predicting the inevitable solution (production quotas based on historical acreage)
Main Conclusion:
The grain board will have to impose quotas limiting farmers to a flat percentage of their previously cultivated grain acreage
Logical Structure:
The guaranteed price policy creates a safety net that encourages overproduction (since farmers know they can always sell excess grain), which forces the grain board to eventually limit production by capping each farmer's allowed acreage at a percentage of what they historically grew
Prethinking:
Question type:
Misc. - This is a strategic decision question asking what action would be most effective for minimizing profit impact from predicted grain quotas
Precision of Claims
The key claim is that quotas will limit farmers to 'a certain flat percentage of the grain acreage they cultivated previously' - this is about acreage/land area, not total production or efficiency
Strategy
Since quotas will be based on past acreage at a flat percentage, we need to think about what a farmer could do now to position themselves advantageously. The quota system will look backwards at historical acreage, so the farmer should consider actions that either maximize their baseline acreage for quota calculations or prepare them to be more profitable within whatever quota they receive
Select in advance currently less profitable grain fields and retire them if the quota takes effect. This approach is reactive and wasteful. If we voluntarily retire land now, we're reducing our baseline acreage that the quota calculations will be based on. This actually hurts our position because quotas will limit us to a percentage of what we previously cultivated - retiring land now means a smaller baseline for future quota calculations.
Seek long-term contracts to sell grain at a fixed price. While this might provide price stability, it doesn't address the core issue of production limitations under the quota system. We'll still be restricted in how much we can grow regardless of our selling arrangements. This choice misses the point that the problem is about production capacity, not selling arrangements.
Replace obsolete tractors with more efficient new ones. Efficiency improvements help with profitability in general, but they don't help with the quota issue. Since quotas are based on acreage (land area), not on production efficiency, having better tractors won't increase the amount of land we're allowed to farm under the quota system.
Put marginal land under cultivation and grow grain on it. This is the most strategic approach. Since quotas will be calculated as 'a certain flat percentage of the grain acreage they cultivated previously,' expanding our current acreage baseline now means we'll have a higher quota allocation later. Even if we can only farm 70% of our previous acreage, 70% of a larger baseline is better than 70% of a smaller baseline. This directly leverages how the quota system will work.
Agree with other farmers on voluntary cutbacks in grain production. This is counterproductive for individual profit maximization. Cutting back now reduces our baseline acreage, which means lower quota allocations in the future. While this might help the overall overproduction problem, it hurts our individual position when quotas are eventually imposed.