Cognitive scientist: Using the pioneering work of comparative psychologist Gordon Gallup as a model, several studies have investigated animals' capaci...
GMAT Critical Reasoning : (CR) Questions
Cognitive scientist: Using the pioneering work of comparative psychologist Gordon Gallup as a model, several studies have investigated animals' capacity for mirror self-recognition (MSR). Most animals exposed to a mirror respond only with social behavior, such as aggression. However, in the case of the great apes, repeated exposure to mirrors leads to self-directed behaviors, such as exploring the inside of the mouth, suggesting that these animals recognize the reflection as an image of self. The implication of these studies is that the great apes have a capacity for self-awareness unique among nonhuman species.
The cognitive scientist makes which of the following assumptions in the argument above?
Passage Analysis:
| Text from Passage | Analysis |
|---|---|
| Using the pioneering work of comparative psychologist Gordon Gallup as a model, several studies have investigated animals' capacity for mirror self-recognition (MSR). |
|
| Most animals exposed to a mirror respond only with social behavior, such as aggression. |
|
| However, in the case of the great apes, repeated exposure to mirrors leads to self-directed behaviors, such as exploring the inside of the mouth, suggesting that these animals recognize the reflection as an image of self. |
|
| The implication of these studies is that the great apes have a capacity for self-awareness unique among nonhuman species. |
|
Argument Flow:
The argument starts with research background, then presents a contrast between typical animal behavior (social responses to mirrors) and great ape behavior (self-directed responses to mirrors). This behavioral difference leads to the conclusion about great apes' unique self-awareness.
Main Conclusion:
Great apes have a capacity for self-awareness that's unique among all non-human species.
Logical Structure:
The evidence (great apes use mirrors for self-examination while other animals don't) supports the conclusion (great apes are uniquely self-aware among non-humans). The argument assumes that mirror self-recognition behavior is a reliable indicator of self-awareness and that no other non-human species demonstrates this capacity.
Prethinking:
Question type:
Assumption - We need to find what the cognitive scientist must believe to be true for their conclusion to hold. The conclusion is that great apes have self-awareness that's unique among nonhuman species.
Precision of Claims
The key claims involve behavioral differences (social vs self-directed behavior), cognitive capacity (self-awareness), and exclusivity (unique among nonhuman species). The scientist moves from observable mirror behaviors to internal mental states.
Strategy
To find assumptions, we need to identify gaps in the logic that could falsify the conclusion while keeping the stated facts intact. The scientist concludes that great apes are uniquely self-aware based on their mirror behavior, so we need to think about what must be true for this reasoning to work.
This choice suggests that Gallup's work alone established the uniqueness of great apes' MSR capacity. However, the passage states that 'several studies have investigated animals' capacity for MSR' using Gallup's work 'as a model.' The scientist's conclusion is based on these multiple studies, not just Gallup's original work. This isn't a necessary assumption for the argument.
This is the correct answer. The scientist concludes that great apes are uniquely self-aware among nonhumans based on their MSR behavior. For this reasoning to work, we must assume that MSR capacity is necessary for self-awareness. If animals could be self-aware without MSR ability, then other species might possess self-awareness through different means, making great apes not unique. This assumption is essential for the conclusion to hold.
This choice is too extreme and goes beyond what the scientist assumes. The scientist only needs to assume that MSR capacity is necessary for self-awareness, not that a single instance of social behavior proves permanent incapacity for self-awareness. Animals might learn or develop MSR over time, and this choice addresses immediate behavior rather than underlying capacity.
The scientist doesn't need to assume that these are the only two possible behaviors animals can exhibit when exposed to mirrors. The argument works fine even if animals could show other types of behavior, as long as the distinction between social and self-directed behaviors holds for the species discussed.
This choice actually contradicts what the scientist must assume. If animals could demonstrate self-awareness in other ways besides MSR, then great apes wouldn't necessarily be unique in their self-awareness capacity. The scientist's conclusion requires assuming that MSR is the key indicator of self-awareness, making this choice the opposite of a necessary assumption.