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By the early 1970s, historian Gabriel Kolko and economist George Stigler had independently reached compatible conclusions about the interests served by the United States government's regulation of business during the Progressive era (1890-1915). Kolko argued that big business led the struggle for federal regulation and that regulatory legislation was motivated primarily by legislators' desire to benefit business, not, as the view dominant up until that time had held, by the desire to protect the public interest. As Stigler explained, the federal government's ability to subsidize business, to control the entry of foreign goods, and to fix prices could be used by businesses to their advantage, just as campaign contributions from businesses could be used to advantage by legislators. There is no denying Kolko's and Stigler's basic claims. Nevertheless, businesses within an industry did not always welcome being regulated, nor did industries necessarily respond uniformly to legislators' efforts to enact regulations affecting them. All but one major railroad in 1905 opposed an expansion of the regulatory power of the Interstate Commerce Committee (ICC) of the United States Senate, and though the Hepburn Act, which granted the ICC rate-making power in the railroad industry, was passed the following year, commercial users of the railroads were divided about the passage of the act: the coal industry opposed it, the agricultural industry favored it, and the lumber industry was split. : Reading Comprehension (RC)