A group of children of various ages was read stories in which people caused harm, some of those people doing...
GMAT Critical Reasoning : (CR) Questions
A group of children of various ages was read stories in which people caused harm, some of those people doing so intentionally, and some accidentally. When asked about appropriate punishments for those who had caused harm, the younger children, unlike the older ones, assigned punishments that did not vary according to whether the harm was done intentionally or accidentally. Younger children, then, do not regard people's intentions as relevant to punishment.
Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the conclusion above?
Passage Analysis:
Text from Passage | Analysis |
A group of children of various ages was read stories in which people caused harm, some of those people doing so intentionally, and some accidentally. |
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When asked about appropriate punishments for those who had caused harm, the younger children, unlike the older ones, assigned punishments that did not vary according to whether the harm was done intentionally or accidentally. |
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Younger children, then, do not regard people's intentions as relevant to punishment. |
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Argument Flow:
We start with the experimental setup where kids heard stories about intentional and accidental harm. Then we get the key finding that younger kids punished both types of harm the same way while older kids didn't. Finally, the author concludes that this means younger children don't consider intentions when thinking about punishment.
Main Conclusion:
Younger children do not regard people's intentions as relevant to punishment
Logical Structure:
The argument uses evidence from one specific study (equal punishment regardless of intent) to make a sweeping claim about how younger children generally think about intentions and punishment. The logic assumes that punishment assignment directly reflects whether kids think intentions matter.
Prethinking:
Question type:
Weaken - We need to find information that would reduce our belief in the conclusion that younger children don't regard people's intentions as relevant to punishment
Precision of Claims
The conclusion makes a broad claim about younger children's cognitive abilities regarding intentions and punishment based on their responses in one specific experimental setting
Strategy
To weaken this conclusion, we need to find alternative explanations for why younger children assigned the same punishments regardless of intent. The key is to show that equal punishment assignment doesn't necessarily mean they don't understand or consider intentions - there could be other reasons for their behavior
This provides a strong alternative explanation for the experimental results. If determining whether harm was intentional or accidental requires mature psychological understanding, then younger children might not have been able to distinguish between the two types of harm in the stories. This means their equal punishment assignment could be due to their inability to recognize the difference, not because they don't think intentions matter for punishment. This directly undermines the author's conclusion by showing that the evidence doesn't necessarily support the claim.
Knowing that the severity of harm was clearly stated doesn't weaken the conclusion about intentions. The argument isn't about whether children understand harm severity - it's specifically about whether they consider intentions when assigning punishment. This information is irrelevant to the conclusion and doesn't provide an alternative explanation for why younger children assigned equal punishments regardless of intent.
Information about younger children's likelihood to cause unintentional harm doesn't affect the conclusion about how they view intentions in punishment decisions. Whether they personally cause harm accidentally has no bearing on their cognitive understanding of intentions when judging others' actions. This is completely unrelated to the experimental findings about punishment assignment.
This actually strengthens rather than weakens the argument. If older children punished similarly to adults, it suggests their differentiation based on intent reflects mature moral reasoning. This supports the implication that younger children lack this mature understanding, reinforcing rather than challenging the author's conclusion about younger children not considering intentions.
This information is irrelevant to the conclusion about intentions. The fact that younger children varied punishments based on harm severity shows they can make distinctions when assigning punishment, but it doesn't address whether they consider intentions. The conclusion specifically claims they don't regard intentions as relevant, and this choice doesn't challenge that specific claim.